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Abstract
After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
resolved the issue of what constitutes an “adverse action” under the
Title VII anti-retaliation statute, the scope of employer liability was
substantially broadened. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforced the
broad intent behind the anti-retaliation statute and acknowledged the
statute’s remedial purpose. The Fifth Circuit, however, has been
reluctant to expand employer liability as evidenced through its
interpretation of the “adverse action” prong relating to coworker
harassment. More specifically, the Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance”
standard, which is used to judge whether an employer is liable for
coworker harassment in retaliation for an employee opposing unlawful
employment activities, conflicts with the underlying purpose of the antiretaliation statute. No other circuit has such a stringent requirement and,
unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit’s unique interpretation prevents many
plaintiffs from obtaining justifiable relief. The Fifth Circuit applied this
standard in Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., which illustrated
the frustrations surrounding the denial of John Ketterer’s retaliation
claim. By reviewing other circuit courts’ analysis, legislative intent,
Supreme Court precedent, and public policy, this Note explains how the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision is
misguided and proposes a simple solution to this intricate problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Yellow Transportation, Inc. (YTI), now known as “YRC Freight,”1
was a leading transporter of industrial, commercial, and retail goods
throughout North America.2 This multibillion-dollar company had
shipping terminals located throughout the United States and was known
for its dedication to safety, service, and the community.3 The company’s
core values included, “[w]ork safely,” “[d]emonstrate good citizenship,”
1. YTI was recently renamed “YRC Freight” and is a freight transportation division of
YRC Worldwide, Inc. Mary Mitchell, Yellow Transportation Inc. Discrimination Case Shows
Why Racism Is so Frustrating, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012, 5:48 PM),
http://www.suntimes.com/news/mitchell/13551623-452/yellow-transportation-inc-discrimina
tion-case-shows-why-racism-is-so-frustrating.html; see also YRC Freight Profile, YRC
FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/about/profile.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). Even though YRC
Freight is the company that was formed after YTI merged with Roadway Express, Inc., I will be
referring to YTI throughout this Note because this is the company that existed at the time John
Ketterer brought his Title VII claims against YTI.
2. YRC Freight Profile, supra note 1.
3. See id.
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and “[a]ct with integrity.”4 “With more than 160 combined years of
moving big shipments,”5 YTI was, safe to say, an accomplished freight
company. However, some of YTI’s terminals did not live up to YTI’s
esteemed corporate citizenship.6 The Dallas, Texas terminal, in
particular, exemplified a workplace that failed to meet YTI’s
“commitment to diversity.”7
To say that the Dallas terminal was “a work-place that could be quite
mean-spirited, crude, and insulting” would be an understatement.8 The
terminal was rife with racial prejudice, and harassment was common.9
For example, white employees broadcasted racial slurs such as “nigger”
and “wetback” over company radios, and employees tied nooses onto
the terminal’s dock.10 Racially offensive graffiti, drawings, and cartoons
were also located throughout the Dallas terminal.11 Words such as
“greaser,” “taco bender,” “cotton picker,” “jiggaboo,” and “[a]ll niggers
must die” are just a few examples of the language that was scattered
around the workplace.12
To make matters worse, this abuse also targeted employees who
associated with minority employees.13 One of these employees was a
white dockworker named John Ketterer (Ketterer), who had worked at
YTI’s Dallas terminal since 1990.14 It was “well known to others at the
facility” that Ketterer had “longstanding friendships with AfricanAmerican and Hispanic co-workers.”15 As a result of these
4. Code of Business Conduct, YRC WORLDWIDE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.yrcw.com/
corporategovernance/code_of_business_conduct.pdf.
5. Awards, YRC FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/award/index.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2014).
6. See, e.g., Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008) (noting a discharge for “engaging in outrageous conduct,
including threatening a coworker”); EEOC v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 09 C 7693, 2010 WL
2891673, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2010) (describing a class action where employees sued YTI
for various claims, including employment discrimination).
7. Diversity, YRC FREIGHT, http://www.yrc.com/career-resource-center/diversity.html
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
8. See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied
sub nom. Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012).
9. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, Hernandez, 670 F.3d 644 (No. 11-1361)
(“Racist language was common. Dockworkers, and at least one supervisor, frequently uttered
racial slurs and insults directed at African-American and Hispanic employees.”).
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id.
12. Transcript of Record at 5092–93, 5100, 5113–15, 5155; Hernandez, 670 F.3d 644
(No. 11-1361).
13. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 655.
14. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008).
15. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 7; see Transcript of Record, supra
note 12, at 4350, 5109, 5167.
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relationships, white coworkers frequently called Ketterer a “nigger
lover” and other racial slurs.16 This verbal abuse eventually escalated
into coworkers vandalizing Ketterer’s personal property and work area.
For example, coworkers glued his locker shut, cut his vehicle’s brake
lines, put human excrement in his lunchbox, and greased his work
vehicle.17 Ketterer began to change his daily routine for the sole purpose
of avoiding as much workplace harassment as possible.18 He even began
to take his breaks in a different room and stopped using the company
restroom.19
After finding enough courage to stand up to the continuous barrage
of harassment, Ketterer and other minority employees protested against
workplace discrimination outside of the Dallas terminal around
November 2004.20 Little did Ketterer know, this protest would only
exacerbate the problem.21 As the abuse escalated, Ketterer began
receiving treatment for depression, headaches, anxiety, and sleep
disorders.22 Ketterer complained to management on multiple occasions,
but management did nothing to curtail the behavior against him and the
minorities working for YTI.23 Furthermore, some complaints by
employees “were posted on a public bulletin board, leading to even
more harassment of the complaining employees.”24
Realizing YTI would not redress this constant workplace abuse,
Ketterer and seven other employees sued YTI in federal court alleging
YTI was liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act (TCHRA).25
After this brief but shocking explanation of what Ketterer endured at
YTI, one would expect that, provided he had adequate legal
representation, he would receive some sort of legal remedy through his
suit against YTI. Unfortunately, the trial and appellate courts awarded
Ketterer no legal remedy, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for

16. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5170, 5246–48, 5492, 5836–37.
17. Id. at 5252, 5263, 5265.
18. Id. at 5258.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5236, 5248, 5256, 5837–38.
21. See Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933 (2007) (discussing how
“[i]ndividuals who complain about workplace discrimination are frequently labeled as
troublemakers by those in positions of authority within the organization”).
22. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5252, 5257.
23. Id. at 5237–38, 5247–48.
24. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 10–11.
25. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001–.556 (West 2006)).
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a writ of certiorari.26 The most troubling aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s
holding was the court’s interpretation of Ketterer’s “retaliation” claim
under Title VII.27 The court held that YTI was not liable under Title
VII’s “anti-retaliation provision” because the adverse actions against
Ketterer were performed by “ordinary employees” and were not “In
furtherance of the employer’s business.”28 This interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision is impractical and differs from the analysis of
all other circuits.29 Furthermore, this decision could have disastrous
consequences for the millions of employees who work in the Fifth
Circuit’s jurisdiction.
With federal retaliation claims increasing significantly over the past
ten-to-fifteen years, issues concerning employer liability are becoming
more pervasive in our country’s legal system.30 For this and many other
reasons, this Note aims to address a small part of the employer liability
landscape and to shed light on the Fifth Circuit’s incorrect interpretation
of the anti-retaliation provision. Part I explains the background of the
anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); the purpose behind
the statute; and how retaliation claims are brought under Title VII. Part
II discusses the confusion surrounding the proper test to apply to prima
facie cases of retaliation and how the Supreme Court resolved this issue.
Part III explains the Fifth Circuit case Hernandez v. Yellow
Transportation, Inc.,31 and more specifically, Ketterer’s retaliation
claim against YTI. Part III also describes how the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of retaliation claims involving coworker harassment
differs from all other circuits. Part IV identifies the problems with the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the anti-retaliation provision and proposes a
solution to remedy the Fifth Circuit’s misguided interpretation.

26. Docket Files, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1361.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014); Hernandez v.
Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 656–58 (5th Cir. 2012); Arrieta, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1.
27. The provision at issue was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
28. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 3.
30. Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1997–FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
31. 670 F.3d 644.
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I. DRUMROLL PLEASE: INTRODUCING THE “ANTI-RETALIATION”
PROVISION
Before exploring the legal ramifications of Ketterer’s suit against
YTI, one should understand the origins and purpose of the antiretaliation provision. What makes the statute important in the
employment context? How does one actually file a retaliation claim
under Title VII? These questions should be answered to fully
understand why the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is misguided.
A. The Origin of the Anti-retaliation Provision
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is part of § 704(a) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
in response to the racial turbulence that swept the nation during the
early 1960’s.33 The catalyst for these events began on June 11, 1963
when President Kennedy sent National Guard troops to the University
of Alabama to enforce a desegregation order.34 This event, coupled with
months of riots and demonstrations stemming from racial tension,
forced the federal government to take action.35 In addition to publicly
denouncing the racially-induced violence, President Kennedy sent
proposed legislation to Congress to help alleviate America’s equality
problems.36
The proposed legislation was originally titled the “Civil Rights Act
of 1963.”37 It was divided into eight Titles, each of which dealt with a
separate issue under Title VII of the proposed act. 38 In general, the bill
“was . . . a remedial measure designed to begin the process of
overturning a century’s worth of Jim Crow [laws].”39 Furthermore, Title
VII was intended to benefit not just African Americans, but all of
America.40 This is evident when looking at the legislative history “in the
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
33. Michael J. Fellows, Civil Rights—Shades of Race: An Historically Informed Reading
of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 397 (2004); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth, and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 670 (1995) (explaining how racially fueled events in
Birmingham, Alabama, caused President Kennedy to have a civil rights bill drafted).
34. CIVIL RIGHTS 1960–66, at 217–18 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1967); Fellows, supra note 33,
at 397. See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 75 (1992).
35. Fellows, supra note 33, at 398–99.
36. CIVIL RIGHTS 1960–66, supra note 34, at 175.
37. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the same bill as the one cited here, but, because it was
not passed until the following year, was retitled with the year 1964. Fellows, supra note 33, at
400.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 405.
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context of the larger social and historical movements” because
theoretically, a more productive African American betters both himself
and the community around him.41
B. The Purpose of the Anti-retaliation Provision
As could be expected, the general purpose of Title VII is to protect
individuals from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.42 Oftentimes, because Title VII is known for prohibiting
employer discrimination, retaliation claims are brought in conjunction
with discrimination claims under Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision.43 By definition, the “two provisions work in tandem to
protect workers.”44 However, the language of the anti-retaliation
provision is much broader than the statutory language of the antidiscrimination provision.
Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.45
Thus, for an anti-discrimination claim to be valid, “the difference in
treatment must be related to the employment relationship.”46 This
notion is illustrated in subsection (1) where the unlawful employment
practice is “with respect to [the employee’s] compensation, terms,
41. Id.
42. Marilee L. Miller, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a Broad Reading of Title
VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505, 505 (footnotes omitted); See also Lindsay
Roshkind, Employment Law: An Adverse Action Against Employers: The Supreme Court’s
Expansion of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 59 FLA. L. REV. 707 (2007) (discussing how
the goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is “to compensate individuals who have suffered as a
result of an unlawful employment practice”).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
44. Jessica L. Beeler, Comment, Turning Title VII’s Protection Against Retaliation into a
Never-Fulfilled Promise, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 141, 144 (2008).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
46. Beeler, supra note 44, at 144.
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conditions, or privileges.”47
However, this qualifying language does not exist in the antiretaliation provision. The anti-retaliation provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint
labor-management
committee
controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including onthe-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.48
Nothing in the anti-retaliation provision specifies whether the
discrimination must be related to certain aspects of employment.49 The
statute simply says that an employer cannot discriminate against an
employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice.50
Furthermore, the anti-retaliation statute does not explain how “harmful
the difference in treatment must be in order to constitute retaliation.”51
Thus, because “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion” of statutory language, the Supreme
Court held that Congress intended for the anti-retaliation provision to
have a broad application that differs from the anti-discrimination
provision.52
Additionally, while discrimination and retaliation claims are usually
brought in conjunction with one another, a plaintiff does not have to be
successful on a discrimination claim to still have a valid retaliation
claim.53 This reinforces the notion that courts have interpreted the antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation provisions to be similar yet
sufficiently distinct from one another.54 The Supreme Court bolstered
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
49. Beeler, supra note 44, at 145.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
51. Beeler, supra note 44, at 145.
52. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66 (2006) (holding that it is
not “anomalous to read the [anti-retaliation provision] to provide broader protection for victims
of retaliation than for . . . victims of . . . discrimination”).
53. Archuleta v. Colo. Dep’t of Insts., Div. of Youth Servs., 936 F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir.
1991).
54. See id. at 487 n.2.
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this argument in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
and added that the anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination statutes
should not be limited by each other.55 Before exploring the problems
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez,56 the procedural aspects
of a retaliation claim are important to understand.
C. Procedural Details of Retaliation Claims Under Title VII
Title VII protections are in place because they can provide a remedy
to any employee who feels that his or her employer has treated him or
her unlawfully.57 This unlawful treatment can range from racially based
demotions to termination of employment in retaliation for participating
in lawfully protected activities.58 An employee initiates a retaliation
claim by first filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).59 The EEOC has the authority to
“investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary
compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil
actions against employers . . . named in a discrimination charge.”60 As it
pertains to retaliation claims that may be pursued in court, a
“potential . . . plaintiff must always file a charge with the EEOC and
seek a right-to-sue letter before going to court to pursue the retaliation
claim.”61
After an employee has obtained the right to sue from the EEOC, the
employee must file a retaliation claim against his or her employer and
has the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.62
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must satisfy
the elements laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.63 Under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, to establish a prima facie case of
55. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64 (holding that “the antiretaliation provision, unlike the
substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment”).
56. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012).
57. Beeler, supra note 44, at 146.
58. Id. Lawfully protected activities include protesting workplace discrimination, filing
complaints to management, filing lawsuits, and many more.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)–(d) (2011) (explaining how before the actual claim is filed,
the employee making the claim must first consult a counselor in order to try and resolve the
issue).
60. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
61. Beeler, supra note 44, at 147 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (2006)).
62. See John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 543–44 (2007) (stating that an employee must “establish[] a prima
facie case of retaliation using circumstantial evidence”).
63. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). “Even though the Supreme Court introduced this indirect
proof scheme for substantive discrimination claims, lower courts universally have adapted it to
retaliation cases as well.” Sanchez, supra note 62, at 542–43; e.g., McMillan v. Rust Coll., Inc.,
710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983).
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retaliation the plaintiff must prove that: “(1) she engaged in statutorily
protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
action.”64 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove the prima facie case of
retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence.65
If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie retaliation case,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to provide a “legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”66 The
defendant’s burden of proof is light in comparison to the plaintiff’s
because the defendant simply needs to produce evidence that raises a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant acted in a
discriminatory manner against the plaintiff.67 If the defendant proffers
legitimate evidence that rebuts plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the burden
of proof then switches back to the plaintiff to persuade the court that the
defendant’s reason is merely a pretext.68 In other words, the plaintiff
must prove that “the employer was in fact motivated by retaliation in
making its employment decision.”69 The court resolves these procedural
issues, and, as will be explained later, the Fifth Circuit differs from the
majority interpretation in its analysis of the second element of a prima
facie retaliation claim.
II. IT’S A BIRD, IT’S A PLANE, IT’S BURLINGTON: BURLINGTON’S
MUCH NEEDED GUIDANCE
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White was a pivotal
case for employment lawyers across the country. Until Burlington,
circuits applied different standards to their “adverse action” analysis
when deciding retaliation claims. Burlington provided much needed
guidance to the circuits and helped alleviate most concerns as to the
proper interpretation of prima facie retaliation claims. But,
unfortunately for John Ketterer, Burlington did not resolve all questions
related to the adverse action prong.
A. Pre-Burlington: A History of Circuit Court Inconsistency
While the requirements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
seem rather straightforward, courts have struggled with the second
64. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 543–44 (footnotes omitted); See, e.g., Taylor v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008).
65. E.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003).
66. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long v.
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981).
68. Id. at 255 n.10.
69. Sanchez, supra note 62, at 544.
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prong of the retaliation analysis.70 The second prong of a prima facie
retaliation claim is that the employee suffered an “adverse action.”71
Prior to Burlington,72 courts did not consistently define what constituted
an “adverse action.”73 This inconsistency was primarily caused by the
differing interpretations of the phrase “discriminate against” in the antiretaliation statute.74 This confusion resulted in three majority
interpretations of the correct meaning of “adverse action.”75
1. The “Ultimate Employment Actions” Standard
The Fifth Circuit adopted the “ultimate employment actions”
standard.76 This was the minority interpretation and in accordance with
its atypical analysis in Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit was unsurprisingly
this standard’s most consistent follower.77 The crux of this
interpretation was that only ultimate employment actions such as wages,
benefits, hiring, firing, and demotions satisfy the “adverse action”
standard of a retaliation claim.78 Even if the action was clearly
retaliatory in nature, any lesser actions such as “a negative performance
evaluation, an uncomfortable work environment, or lateral job transfers
with similar pay” do not qualify as an “adverse action.”79 The Fifth
Circuit argued that Title VII was created to deal with ultimate
employment decisions, not decisions made by employers that may have
some “tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”80 Thus, if a
worker who protests workplace discrimination is given a negative
performance review solely because of his protest, the Fifth Circuit was
content with holding that the negative review did not constitute an
70. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–42 (9th Cir. 2000).
71. Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008).
72. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
73. Megan E. Mowrey, Establishing Retaliation for Purposes of Title VII, 111 PENN ST. L.
REV. 893, 894 (2007).
74. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57.
75. See Miller, supra note 42, at 513–23 (discussing different interpretations of the term
“adverse action”).
76. Id. at 513.
77. Id. The Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit were the other circuit courts that used to
abide by the “ultimate employment actions” standard. E.g., Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am.,
126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.
1997).
78. See, e.g., Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Title VII was
designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by
employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”).
79. Miller, supra note 42, at 513; e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th
Cir.1999) (holding that “employment actions are not adverse where pay, benefits, and level of
responsibility remain the same”).
80. Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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“adverse action” against the employee. Although alarming because of
the numerous ways an employer could lawfully retaliate against an
employee, this standard was fortunately the least followed
interpretation.
2. The “Materially Adverse” Standard
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the “materially adverse”
standard.81 Most courts defined the materially adverse standard as a
retaliatory action that “must result in an adverse effect on the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”82 In other words, there must
be a close relationship between the retaliatory act and employment.83
Thus, unlike the “ultimate employment action” standard, the “materially
adverse” test considered hostile or abusive work environments as
adverse actions against an employee.84 This is because an abusive work
environment undoubtedly can negatively affect the employee’s
“conditions . . . of employment.”85 The “materially adverse” test did
not, however, include minor complaints and other actions that were not
employment related.86 Unfortunately, this standard produced many
unpredictable results because of courts’ subjective interpretations of
which actions actually qualified as “employment related.”87
3. The “Deterrence” Standard
The third and final standard was known as the “deterrence”
standard.88 The “deterrence” standard took a more lenient approach and
mirrored the EEOC’s definition of an adverse employment action.89
Plaintiffs must first file their claims with the EEOC before bringing
their action in federal court.90 The EEOC defines its adverse action
standard as “an action taken to try to keep someone from opposing a
discriminatory practice, or from participating in an employment

81. Miller, supra note 42, at 515–17; Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182,
1189 (10th Cir. 2002).
82. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (brackets omitted).
83. Id.
84. Miller, supra note 42, at 515.
85. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See id. (excluding mention of minor complaints and other actions not employment
related in the standard of retaliation).
87. See Miller, supra note 42, at 515 (“[T]he Second Circuit has evaluated each case
based on its specific fact pattern.”).
88. Id. at 520.
89. See id. (discussing the EEOC’s definition of retaliation).
90. See supra Section I.B.
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discrimination proceeding.”91 Other courts defined the “deterrence”
standard as an action that would “dissuade[] a reasonable [employee]
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”92
Thus, this standard covered retaliatory measures such as lateral
transfers, negative reviews, and changes in work schedules.93 The
reasoning was that these types of employment actions were likely to
deter employees from participating in protected activities, such as
protesting work discrimination or filing claims against their employer.94
Because the intent behind the anti-retaliation statute is to protect
employees who have participated in lawfully protected activities from
retaliatory acts at the hands of their employers, excluding these
retaliatory acts is simply ignoring the intent and meaning behind the
anti-retaliation statute. Therefore, if a court does not qualify these types
of employment actions as “adverse,” that court is essentially
circumventing the fundamental purpose behind the anti-retaliation
statute.95 With three different interpretations of what “adverse action”
truly meant, circuit courts needed further guidance in their analyses of
the anti-retaliation statute.
B. Burlington Finally Resolves the “Adverse Action” Debate
The Supreme Court finally provided such guidance through its
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.96 In
Burlington, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company
(Burlington) hired Sheila White in June 1997 to work as a “track
laborer” at the company’s Tennessee stockyard.97 Shortly after hiring
her, Burlington reassigned White to a more desirable position as a
“forklift operator.”98 Only a couple of months into the job, White’s
supervisor began making sexist remarks to White and continually
insulted her in front of her coworkers.99 Eventually, White complained
91. Facts About Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm (last
visited Aug. 20, 2014).
92. Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); see, e.g.,
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that Title VII’s statutory
retaliation clauses prohibit adverse action based on retaliatory motive aimed to deter employees
from making a charge of discrimination).
93. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
97. Id. at 57 (explaining that a track laborer is “a job that involves removing and replacing
track components, transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo
spillage from the right-of-way”).
98. Id.
99. Her supervisor continually told her that women should not be working in his
department and he made numerous inappropriate remarks about her in front of her male
coworkers. Id. at 58.
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to Burlington management about her supervisor’s behavior, and, shortly
after complaining, White was reassigned to her old position as a
standard “track laborer.”100
After being reassigned, White filed a complaint with the EEOC,
asserting that her job reassignment amounted to unlawful gender
discrimination and retaliation for complaining to management about her
supervisor’s behavior.101 Only a few days later, Burlington suspended
White without pay for insubordination resulting from a workplace
dispute.102 After exhausting her available remedies through the EEOC,
White filed suit in federal court alleging that Burlington retaliated
against her by changing her job responsibilities and suspending her for
thirty-seven days without pay.103 The district court ruled in favor of
White, and, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s
decision but was still conflicted as to the proper standard to apply in
regards to the “adverse action” analysis.104
After granting certiorari to resolve this disagreement, the Supreme
Court explained that the anti-retaliation provision “is intended to
provide ‘exceptionally broad protection’ for protestors of discriminatory
employment practices.”105 This is evident when comparing the language
of the anti-retaliation provision and the anti-discrimination provision.106
The anti-discrimination provision contains language such as, “hire,”
“discharge,” “compensation,” “privileges of employment,” and “status
as an employee,” all of which limit the provision’s scope to “actions
that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.”107 The
anti-retaliation provision contains no such language that limits its scope
to employment or workplace conditions.108
The Court interpreted this difference in language as purposeful
because of the different objectives served under both provisions.109 The
100. Id. Management “explained that the re-assignment reflected co-workers’ complaints
that, in fairness, a ‘more senior man’ should have the ‘less arduous and cleaner job’ of forklift
operator.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. The event of insubordination was in dispute between White and her new supervisor
and through internal grievance procedures, Burlington later concluded that White had not been
insubordinate. Id. She later was reinstated with “backpay for the 37 days she was suspended.”
Id. at 58–59.
103. Id. at 59.
104. Id.
105. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, EEOC, INTERPRETIVE MANUAL: A REFERENCE MANUAL TO
TITLE VII LAW FOR COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION § 491.2, at 383 (1972) [hereinafter EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL], cited with
approval in Burlington, 548 U.S. at 65.
106. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61–63.
107. Id. at 62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
108. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 62.
109. Id. at 63.
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anti-discrimination provision intends to prevent, in the workplace,
individuals from being discriminated against because of their status.110
To accomplish this goal, Congress only needed to prohibit employmentrelated discrimination.111 The anti-retaliation provision, however,
intends to “prevent[] an employer from interfering (through retaliation)
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of [Title
VII’s] basic guarantees.”112 Simply prohibiting employment-related
discrimination would not accomplish this objective because there are
many effective ways an employer can retaliate against an employee that
are not strictly employment related.113 Thus, Burlington held that the
scope of the anti-retaliation provision is not limited to actions affecting
employment or even actions occurring at the workplace.114
Through this decision, the Court expressly rejected the “ultimate
employment action” standard because of that standard’s adherence to
excluding any action unrelated to the employment relationship.115
Instead, the Court adopted more of a “deterrence” standard, as followed
by the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. The Court explained that the
anti-retaliation provision only covers employer actions that would have
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.116 Justice Stephen
Breyer defined this materially adverse standard as employer
actions that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”117
While Justice Breyer claimed that the standard was objective, it
seems clear that there is some subjective element.118 Courts use an
objective standard to evaluate whether a worker was reasonable in
being deterred from bringing a retaliation claim.119 This allows a court
to avoid guessing whether a plaintiff would be deterred from bringing a
retaliation claim because of some unusual subjective reason that is
difficult to verify.120 However, “[c]ontext matters” and, thus, there
should be a certain degree of subjective analysis applied to the
110. Id.
111. Id. Employment-related discrimination refers to aspects of employment that fell under
the “ultimate employment actions” standard discussed in Subsection II.A.1. This includes
wages, hiring, firing, and benefits.
112. Id.
113. Id. For a discussion of the ways that employers can effectively retaliate against
employees through actions not employment related, which in Burlington means actions that are
not “ultimate employment actions,” see supra Subsection II.A.1.
114. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67.
115. For a review and explanation of the “ultimate employment actions” standard, see
supra Subsection II.A.1.
116. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
117. Id. at 57.
118. Id. at 68–69; see Beeler, supra note 44, at 152.
119. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
120. Id. at 68–69.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 11

1444

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

retaliation claim.121 Justice Breyer illustrated this point by using an
example where changing an employee’s hours may make little
difference to many workers, but to a young mother with school-age
children, it could make her life exceedingly more difficult.122
Thus, the Court held that Burlington’s act of reassigning White to a
less desirable position after she complained to management was
materially adverse and, therefore, violated the anti-retaliation statute.123
The act was materially adverse because any reasonable employee, after
observing how White’s discrimination complaint was handled, would
think twice before complaining to management in fear of being demoted
to a less desirable position.124 Furthermore, the Court held that even
though White was awarded full back pay for her thirty-seven day
suspension, an indefinite suspension without pay is in and of itself a
deterrent for an employee who is thinking about reporting a charge of
workplace discrimination.125 Thirty-seven days of an unpaid suspension
can be a serious financial hardship for most employees and a strong
deterrent against bringing a discrimination complaint.126
After Burlington defined the test used to determine what constitutes
an “adverse action,” the circuits finally had a unitary standard they
could follow when analyzing retaliation claims. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court did not resolve all issues surrounding the “adverse
action” prong of a prima facie retaliation claim. In particular, the
question is still unresolved as to whether an employer is liable under the
anti-retaliation statute if coworkers retaliate against an employee for
participating in lawfully protected activities and the employer tolerates
it. This issue and many other retaliation questions are discussed in
Hernandez v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.127

121. Id. at 69 (“[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the
particular circumstances.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 73.
125. Id. at 71–73.
126. Id. at 72–73.
127. 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012).
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III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF HERNANDEZ V. YELLOW
TRANSPORTATION, INC.
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Controversial Decision
As explained in the Introduction, John Ketterer had worked for YTI
for fourteen years before filing suit against the company in 2006.128
After viewing firsthand the way minority employees were treated by
many white coworkers, Ketterer sympathized with the minority
employees and associated almost exclusively with them.129 For his
empathy, white coworkers verbally and physically harassed Ketterer for
years.130 Eventually, after a black employee was unexpectedly
discharged, Ketterer and other minority coworkers picketed outside of
YTI to protest workplace discrimination.131 The protests were
considered lawfully protected activities because the protests opposed
workplace discrimination, which is an unlawful employment practice
under the anti-retaliation provision,132 In other words, the purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision is to protect employees who oppose unlawful
employment practices, and because the protests were opposing unlawful
employment practices, the protests were held to be lawfully protected
activities.133 “This finding is not in dispute.”134
Thus, considering the anti-retaliation provision only protects
employees if there was a causal connection between an employee
engaging in protected conduct and suffering an adverse action, the Fifth
Circuit limited its analysis to events after the protests began.135 This is
because retaliatory conduct can only occur as a reaction to some event
or action and in this case, it was after Ketterer participated in protests
against YTI. Ketterer claimed that after participating in the November
2004 protests, the harassment by his coworkers continued and
escalated.136 On a day when he was not protesting, Ketterer was called
“shitbag” over the company radio and asked why he was not across the
street with his minority friends.137 Additionally, Ketterer claimed that a
coworker threw a lit firecracker at him.138 Ketterer finally complained to
two of his dock supervisors in 2005, after several weeks of being circled
128. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008).
129. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 4350, 5492–93.
130. E.g., id. at 5170.
131. Id. at 5236, 5248, 5256, 5837–38.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
133. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 5243, 5247–48.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 5152.
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in the parking lot by his coworkers in their vehicles.139 Unfortunately,
YTI did nothing to curtail this workplace harassment.140 Realizing this
behavior would continue as long as YTI did not ameliorate the situation,
Ketterer and seven other employees sued YTI in federal court alleging,
among other things, that YTI was liable under Title VII.141
After filing suit in district court, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of YTI in regards to Ketterer’s retaliation claim.142
As to the first prong, the district court held that Ketterer had offered
evidence to show he had engaged in protected activity by protesting
YTI.143 As to the second prong (suffered an adverse action) and third
prong (causation), Ketterer alleged that:
(1) coworkers called him racial names; (2) a coworker
threw a firecracker at him; (3) a group of coworkers
intimidated him by circling him with their buggies while he
was in the yard; (4) his supervisors stared at him and did
not have casual conversations with him; (5) he was
assigned more work and dirtier jobs; and (6) he was
discharged and reinstated without backpay following an
altercation with a coworker.144
The trial court held that “[a] reasonable jury could not [have
found] . . . the first three acts imputable to YTI, because they were made
by ordinary employees and were not made in furtherance of YTI’s
business.”145 The court held that the fourth allegation was not materially
adverse because it would not have discouraged a reasonable employee
from making a discrimination claim.146 Ketterer did not produce enough
evidence for the fifth allegation to overcome summary judgment, and
the sixth allegation lacked sufficient evidence of a causal link between
the action and Ketterer’s participation in protesting, the protected
activity.147 Thus, largely because Ketterer did not satisfy the “adverse
action” prong, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
139. Id. at 5247–48 (describing how on numerous occasions, Ketterer would finish work
and as he walked to the parking lot to leave, his coworkers would circle him in their work
vehicles in menacing, threatening, and intimidating ways).
140. Id. at 5248.
141. Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2271-D, 2008 WL 5220569, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 12, 2008).
142. Id. at *29 (“The court grants summary judgment dismissing all of
plaintiffs’ . . . retaliation claims . . . .”).
143. Id. at *18.
144. Id. at *22.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The trial court also stated that even if Ketterer could establish causation, “YTI has
provided evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [his] discharge and
reinstatement without backpay.” Id.
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YTI.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that
Ketterer did not suffer any adverse employment actions.148 The Fifth
Circuit stated that allegations one through three, addressing whether the
incidents of coworker harassment were valid, were irrelevant because
they were “perpetrated by . . . ordinary employees [and] . . . the alleged
harassment [was not] committed in furtherance of Yellow
Transportation’s business.”149 As to allegations four and five, the Fifth
Circuit held that they were not supported by evidence nor had Ketterer
established a causal link between the actions and the protests.150 Lastly,
the Fifth Circuit held that Ketterer’s allegation that he was reinstated
without back pay151 was without merit because he failed to
“demonstrate that ‘but for’ his participation in protected activities, he
would not have been reinstated without back-pay.”152
This Note is primarily concerned with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of
allegations one through three, addressing coworker harassment. The
Fifth Circuit’s standard for evaluating coworker retaliatory harassment
is troubling. Unlike any other circuit, the Fifth Circuit maintains that if
an employer tolerates coworker harassment against an employee in
retaliation for that employee opposing unlawful employment practices,
the actions of that employee “are not imputable to their employer unless
they are conducted ‘in furtherance of the employer’s business.’”153
Applied to Hernandez, the court explained that the extent of coworker
harassment that Ketterer endured and whether YTI did anything to curb
this abuse is irrelevant as a matter of law.154 The Fifth Circuit was only
concerned with whether the coworkers’ actions were conducted in
furtherance of YTI—not the severity of the coworkers’ actions or
whether YTI tolerated the harassment in retaliation for Ketterer’s
participation in the protests. As Part IV explains, the Fifth Circuit’s
standard is contrary to the intent of the anti-retaliation statute, differs
from Supreme Court precedent, and is almost impossible to satisfy. But
first, what are the other standards that circuits apply to situations like
Hernandez?
148. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012).
149. Id. at 657 (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
150. Id. at 658.
151. “A common remedy for wage violations,” back pay is defined as “an order that the
employer make up the difference between what the employee was paid and the amount he or she
should have been paid.” Back Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/
backpay.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
152. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 658; see Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir.
1996) (explaining that to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
conflict in substantial evidence on the ultimate issue of but-for causation).
153. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (quoting Long, 88 F.3d at 306).
154. Id.
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B. The Fifth Circuit’s Self-Inflicted Loneliness
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that successful retaliation claims are
contingent on proof that the harassment, if committed by ordinary
employees, is in furtherance of the employer’s business is completely
unprecedented.155 To begin, the First,156 Second,157 Third,158 Sixth,159
Seventh,160 Ninth,161 and Tenth162 Circuits have expressly held that a
Title VII retaliation claim can be based on the employer’s toleration of
harassment by coworkers.163 These circuits apply different variations of
a negligence standard to measure employer liability and typically hold
that an employer can be liable for retaliation “if it ‘knew or should have
known about the harassment’ but tolerated or acquiesced in it.”164 If this
standard was applied in Hernandez, Ketterer would most likely have
prevailed on his retaliation claim against YTI and received some form
of relief for YTI’s toleration of coworkers’ behavior towards Ketterer
and other minority employees.
In Knox v. Indiana, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to hold
that “employers can be liable for co-worker actions when they know
about and fail to correct the offensive conduct.”165 In Knox, a woman
filed a sexual harassment complaint against her coworkers and
subsequently suffered “fellow worker harassment and vicious
gossip.”166 After her employer waited more than a month to do anything
about the harassment, she filed a Title VII retaliation claim against her
employer.167 The Seventh Circuit eventually held that the employer was
liable because of its “acquiescence” and emphasized that “[n]othing
indicates why . . . retaliating against a complainant by permitting her
fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title
155. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 3; Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136
(2012) (No. 11-1361) (observing that all courts other than the Fifth Circuit have required proof
of the harassment being committed in furtherance of the employer’s business).
156. E.g., Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1994).
157. E.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir.
1999). Additionally, Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 702 F.3d
685, 698 (2d Cir. 2012), follows verbatim the “material adverse action” standard established by
Burlington and clarifies any doubt surrounding the standard used in Richardson. Rivera
abrogates rulings different from the retaliation analysis used in Richardson.
158. E.g., Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
159. E.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 345 (6th Cir. 2008).
160. E.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
161. E.g., Watson v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 268 F. App’x 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
162. E.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 15.
164. Id. at 16 (quoting Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006)).
165. 93 F.3d at 1334.
166. Id. at 1335.
167. Id. at 1331.
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VII . . . does not fall within this statute.”168
Following the same line of reasoning in Knox, the Third Circuit held
in Jensen v. Potter that the anti-retaliation provision protects an
employee from harassment by coworkers where “management knew or
should have known about the harassment, but ‘failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action.’”169 In Jensen, after the plaintiff reported a
sexual harassment claim to her employer, she was moved to a more
hostile workstation and was constantly harassed for reporting her
previous complaint to management.170 She reported this new harassment
to her employer, but her employer did not attempt to curtail the
workplace harassment, and after nineteen months of suffering, she filed
a retaliation claim against her employer.171 The Third Circuit reversed
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment and held the employer
liable for not taking remedial action to curtail the coworker retaliatory
harassment when it knew or should have known that the harassment was
occurring.172
The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits agree with the Seventh and
Third Circuits’ interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.173 All
three circuits have ruled that an employer will be held liable under the
anti-retaliation provision for failing to act or stop coworker harassment
in retaliation for an employee who participated in a lawfully protected
activity, if the employer knows or should know about the harassment.174
The Sixth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, acknowledged that it was
following the majority interpretation when it reversed a lower court’s
grant of summary judgment for the employer in a Title VII retaliation
case.175 Along with following the majority’s negligence standard, the
Sixth Circuit also affirmatively stated that an employer could be held
168. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 16–17 (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334, 1336) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d
Cir. 1990)). Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2013) does not overrule
Jensen with respect to the Third Circuit’s retaliation analysis. Instead, it addresses procedural
formalities that petitioners must satisfy when filing Title VII claims with administrative
agencies like the EEOC. Id. at 167.
170. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 447.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 453. By overturning a lower court’s summary judgment and establishing a new
line of precedent that only one circuit court at the time had established, one can infer that the
Third Circuit felt very confident in their interpretation of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision.
173. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 17.
174. Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other
grounds, 536 U.S. 919 (2002); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426,
446 (2d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Watson v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 268 F. App’x 624, 626–
27 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 89–90, 95–97 (1st Cir. 2005);
Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1994).
175. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 345–46 (6th Cir. 2008).
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liable if it had “actual or constructive knowledge” of the coworkers’
retaliatory harassment.176
The Tenth Circuit applies a stricter negligence standard in that an
employer is only liable if management “know[s] about the [coworker]
harassment and acquiesce[s] it in such a manner as to condone and
encourage the coworkers’ actions.”177 While this does slightly differ
from the majority negligence standard, it does not come close to the
Fifth Circuit’s narrow standard that coworker harassment must be in
furtherance of the employer’s business.178
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have not affirmatively
ruled in accordance with the majority negligence standard, but they
have stated in dicta that they agree with the majority approach.179 In
addition to the federal circuit court of appeals, most state courts that
have addressed Title VII anti-retaliation issues agree with the majority
negligence standard.180 For example, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that “an employer [may] be liable for co-worker retaliatory
harassment for negligently failing to discover or remedy it.”181 Thus,
most states and all federal circuits differ from the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis that coworker retaliatory harassment must be “in furtherance of
the employer’s business.”182 This divergence from the majority’s
reasoning ignores the underlying intent of the anti-retaliation statute,
differs from Supreme Court precedent, and is a “Catch-22” standard that
is nearly impossible to satisfy.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S
“IN FURTHERANCE” STANDARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A
PRACTICAL SOLUTION
The Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard is unique and
unprecedented. The standard seems to contradict the legislative intent
behind the anti-retaliation provision and ignores similar case law
decided by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the standard legitimately
176. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 19 (quoting Hawkins, 517 F.3d at
347) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
178. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 20.
179. See Csicsmann v. Sallada, 211 F. App’x 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2006); Carpenter v. ConWay Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
180. See, e.g., Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1045 (N.H. 2003); Channon v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 865 (Iowa 2001); Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
751 A.2d 538, 548–49 (N.J. 2000).
181. Madeja, 821 A.2d at 1045 (citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.
1996)).
182. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long
v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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allows for coworker harassment to exist through a “Catch-22” loophole
that enables employers to avoid liability. With these negative effects
readily apparent to the Fifth Circuit, what is the best solution to remedy
this problem? Should the Fifth Circuit fall in line with its sister circuits
and amend its stringent and overbearing analysis? The answer is
multifaceted but, put simply, the standard must change.
A. How the Standard Is Contrary to the Intent Behind the
Anti-Retaliation Provision
No textual provision in Title VII’s anti-retaliation statute suggests
that discrimination against an employee must be employment related.183
No such provision exists because Congress and the EEOC intended for
the anti-retaliation provision to have a broad application that would
protect any employee who had opposed discriminatory employment
practices.184 By denying Ketterer’s retaliation claim because Ketterer
was harassed by “ordinary employees” and not “in furtherance of the
employer’s business,” the Fifth Circuit ignored the broad intent of the
anti-retaliation provision.185 This disregard is evident when evaluating
scenarios analogous to Hernandez.
Consider the following scenario: An employee opposes an unlawful
employment practice and, as a result, is harassed by his coworkers. The
employer knows about the harassment but does nothing to remedy the
situation. In theory, the Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard would
let the employer off the hook as long as the harassment was not in
furtherance of the employer’s business.186 This scenario begs the
question: how often does employee harassment ever “further” the
employer’s business? The answer, unsurprisingly, is very rarely.
Moreover, it appears that the “In Furtherance” standard may only apply
to scenarios where coworkers harass others to force them to work longer
hours to benefit the employer.187 Regardless of the potentially
applicable scenarios, the fact that it is difficult to even imagine a case
where coworkers harass other employees to further the employer’s
business evinces the limited application of the Fifth Circuit’s standard.
Thus, by its very nature, the Fifth Circuit’s unique and limiting
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
184. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington, 548 U.S.
at 65.
185. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id.
187. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–800 (1998) (acknowledging
that it would be rare for harassment to be within the scope of employment, but refusing to hold
categorically that it was always outside the scope of employment); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (1986) (“It would be the rare case where racial harassment against a
co-worker could be thought by the author of the harassment to help with the employer’s
business.”).
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restrictions on Title VII retaliation claims in no way follows the
statute’s purpose of “exceptionally broad protection.”188
B. How Supreme Court Precedent Can Help
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue
presented in Hernandez, the Court has used a similar analyses in cases
involving vicarious liability of employers.189 In Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton190 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,191 employees
“sought to recover against the employer without showing [that] the
employer [was directly] negligent or otherwise at fault.”192 The majority
in both cases stated that “[a]n employer is negligent with respect
to . . . harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct
and failed to stop it.”193 Even the dissenting opinions in both cases
recognized that the employer should be liable if he or she were
negligent in allowing the supervisor’s conduct to occur.194 Thus, it
seems improbable that the Court would differ in its interpretation of the
Fifth Circuit’s “In Furtherance” standard, especially when following the
“broad” intent of the anti-retaliation provision.195
C. The Fifth Circuit’s Glorified “Catch-22”
Another basic but important goal of the anti-retaliation provision is
simply “avoiding harm to employees.”196 This is where the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision truly goes awry.
Because the second prong of a prima facie retaliation claim is not
established when the harassment by ordinary employees is not in
furtherance of the employer’s business,197 almost all types of
harassment by ordinary employees are allowed under the Fifth Circuit’s
“In Furtherance” standard. Almost by definition, coworker harassment

188. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 65 (2006).
189. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 25.
190. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
191. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
192. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting Burlington Indus., 524
U.S. at 747) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. (summarizing the dissents in Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 767 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
195. Id.
196. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. See Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing that “the ‘in
furtherance of the employer’s business’ aspect of the doctrine of respondeat superior suggests
that liability requires a direct relationship between the allegedly discriminatory conduct and the
employer’s business” (citing Shagner v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990))).
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inherently “falls outside the scope of employment,”198 as “[i]t would be
the rare case where . . . harassment . . . could be thought by the author
of harassment to help the employer’s business.”199 This simple but
important logic illustrates the “Catch-22” of the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning. By stating that the harassment by ordinary employees must
be in furtherance of the employer’s business, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has
effectively closed the door on co-worker retaliation claims that other
circuits would entertain.”200 This extreme limitation on retaliation
claims contradicts the statute’s legislative intent and can potentially
deter employees who are gauging whether to oppose unlawful
employment activities.201
This potential and arguably unavoidable deterrent effect starkly
contrasts the remedial nature of the anti-retaliation provision.202 The
drafters of the anti-retaliation provision intended for the statute to limit
employer retaliation as much as possible,203 regardless of whether it was
“in furtherance of the employer’s business.”204 This stringent limitation
imposed by the Fifth Circuit creates a judicial interpretation of the antiretaliation provision that, in a way, significantly alters the statute’s plain
meaning. By imposing this harsh standard on employees attempting to
bring anti-retaliation claims, the Fifth Circuit is indirectly admitting that
certain forms of workplace harassment are legal. This unfortunate
reality is contrary to the fundamental purpose of the anti-retaliation
provision and hopefully the Fifth Circuit will have a change of heart in
the coming years.
D. A Practical Solution That Reflects Reality
While there is no perfect answer as to how to interpret the antiretaliation provision, one thing is clear: the Fifth Circuit’s method is far
from ideal. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning has created a higher standard
for successful coworker retaliation claims and unfortunately, has limited
many employees’ options along the way.205 The Fifth Circuit’s
198. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800.
199. Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
200. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 155, at 6.
201. This deterrent effect conflicts with the legislative intent of the anti-retaliation
provision. Fellows, supra note 33, at 423 (“Congress had made clear that one of the purposes of
Title VII was to encourage private voluntary efforts to improve the racial situation in the United
States.”).
202. See id. at 409 (noting that Title VII is a “remedial statute”).
203. See id. (“[Title VII], if ‘literally constructed,’ appears to prohibit all forms of racial
discrimination in employment.”).
204. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long
v. Eastfield Coll, 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
205. Amicus Curiae Brief of Employment Law Professors in Support of Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 18; Ketterer v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012) (No. 11-1361).
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limitation on what constitutes an adverse action is the reason for this
higher standard and subsequently contradicts the intent behind the antiretaliation provision’s broad applicability.206 In order to conform with
Supreme Court precedent, legislative intent, and a practical standard
that is reasonably plausible to satisfy, the Fifth Circuit should eliminate
its “in furtherance of the employer’s business”207 requirement and
replace it with something similar to the negligence standard used by
almost all circuit courts.208 The negligence standard prevents employers
from turning a blind eye to coworker harassment without legal
ramifications. The negligence standard holds employers accountable
and allows employees to have a remedy besides simply finding another
job. The negligence standard reinforces the public policy argument of
fostering workplaces free of discrimination because, under the Fifth
Circuit’s current standard, this goal is a true legal fiction.
CONCLUSION
John Ketterer witnessed firsthand the effects of workplace
harassment against minorities. His sympathy toward minority
employees led him to become good friends with them at his
workplace.209 Unfortunately, this sympathy backfired and, because of
his association with minorities, Ketterer endured severe harassment
from his white coworkers.210 The worst part about this troubling
situation is that, when Ketterer turned to the legal system for relief, he
received none.211 The Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision is the fundamental reason why employees in
situations similar to Ketterer’s are denied any sort of legal remedy for
their credible retaliation claims.
The primary objective of the anti-retaliation and anti-discrimination
provision is to “avoid[] harm to employees.”212 The Fifth Circuit’s
206. EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL, supra note 105, at 383; see also Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 65 (2006).
207. Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th
Cir. 1996)). Although Ketterer in Hernandez “urge[d the panel] to abandon [the Fifth Circuit’s]
framework for coworker retaliation as articulated in Long,” the panel had to “decline [the]
invitation” because “one panel of the court cannot overturn another.” Id. at 657–58.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit will need to hear a case en banc to overrule Long.
208. For reminder purposes, the negligence standard and its variations are all in accordance
with the underlying theory that an employer can be liable for retaliation if it knew or should
have known about the harassment but tolerated or acquiesced in it. See supra Section III.B and
accompanying text and footnotes.
209. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 4350.
210. Id. at 5170, 5246–48, 5492, 5836.
211. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 649 (affirming the district court’s grant of a summary
judgment against Ketterer).
212. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)).
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reasoning undermines this objective and Ketterer’s lack of relief is a
byproduct of this impractical interpretation. The Fifth Circuit should
discontinue using its “In Furtherance” standard and should adopt the
negligence standard as followed by the majority of circuit courts.
Millions of employees who work in the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction are
not afforded the same Title VII protections as other employees across
the United States. The Fifth Circuit’s “Catch-22” interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision needs to change for the sake of employees
who deserve the fundamental right to act against discrimination, without
the fear of employment based retaliation.
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